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AbstrAct
This Article analyzes the role of Latin American international eco-
nomic law scholarship within the global economic order.  Many of the 
problems that Latin Americans face today relate to the global econo-
my, such as labor conditions, access to medicine, and the use of natural 
resources, among others.  The discussion of these problems, however, 
seldom recognizes the role of international economic law scholarship. 
Although the knowledge created by this scholarship may not complete-
ly explain why States actively behave in a certain way, it can serve to 
explain why they may refrain from certain actions.  This Article argues 
that scholarship on international economic law plays a crucial role in 
the creation and reproduction of the current global economic order.  If 
1 For the original Spanish version of this Article, see Nicolás M. Perrone, ¿Un espacio 
para pensar alternativas?  La academia latinoamericana de derecho internacional económico 
frente al orden económico global, Revista Derecho del Estado N. 36, June 2016, at 199, 
199–226, http://dx.doi.org/10.18601/01229893.n36.07.
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this claim is correct, regional scholarship can do more for Latin America 
than serving the advisory and litigation needs of States.  By recognizing 
its role in constituting the global economic order, international economic 
law scholarship can promote alternative theories and practices that may 
help Latin America and its people find their place in the global economy.
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IntroductIon
The global economy is an arena of many struggles that encompasses 
different regions and players, including Latin America and its people.  In 
this arena, the interests of farmers and indigenous peoples are at stake, 
as well as those of workers, medical patients, and small-business entre-
preneurs.  Against this background, international economic law (IEL) 
is presented to Latin Americans and the rest of the world as the means 
to regulate trade and investment relations between States and foreign 
investors.  This description, however, does not take into account many of 
the players, like the ones just mentioned.  Nor does it take into account 
that IEL has become the principal law of globalization, and, as such, 
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determines the interests and rights of both large multinational compa-
nies and ordinary citizens.2  This does not mean that IEL is preeminent 
to international human rights or environmental law.  But, frequently, 
these other international legal systems play a secondary role when com-
pared to international trade and investment law.
The growing importance of IEL justifies studying not only its legal 
rules, but also the creation of that knowledge and the role of academic 
scholarship in that creation.  The role of scholarship may seem rath-
er modest if we accept that its task is solely to analyze the set of rules, 
determined or determinable, that govern international economic rela-
tions.  From this perspective, IEL would operate under relatively clear 
rules that delineate the interests of each State and how these interests 
can be maximized.  These interests include, for example, expanding a 
State’s markets while ceding the lowest domestic market share possible, 
and attracting foreign investment while ceding the lowest possible por-
tion of sovereignty.3
What this dominant vision ignores is that IEL is not only the result 
of negotiations between States.  Nor is it only the product of a cluster 
of international treaties.  Knowledge created by scholarship also plays a 
central role in shaping IEL and the global economic order.  This knowl-
edge defines not only the interpretation of terms like ‘fair and equitable 
treatment,’ but also the sources of law that give meaning to these terms.4 
Rules of law, in other words, operate within the knowledge created by 
IEL scholarship.5  This knowledge gives life to treaties signed by States 
and governs the negotiation of any IEL obligation.
But the creation of this knowledge, and the knowledge of public 
international law generally, is not the result of broad and equal participa-
tion.  As Chimni explains, international law responds to the interests of a 
2 See Hans W. Baade, Teaching International Economic Law, 16 Journal of Legal Edu-
cation  59, 61–63 (1963) (In 1963, Baade already emphasized the importance of IEL for labor 
law and the rights of workers.).
3 This type of analysis responds to realist or neo-utilitarian visions of international rela-
tions.  See John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together?  Neo-utilitarianism and 
the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52: 4 International Organization 855 (1998).
4 See Martins Paparinskis, The International Minimum Standard and Fair and Equi-
table Treatment (Oxford University Press) (2013).
5 See also Gerry Simpson, On the Magic Mountain: Teaching Public International Law, 
10:1 European Journal of International Law 70, 85 (1999); Akbar Rasulov,  The Structure 
of the International Legal Discourse, in European Society of International Law, Florence 
Founding Conference, 1 (2004), https://esil-sedi.eu/sites/default/files/Rasulov_0.PDF.
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capitalist transnational class.6  Although it is difficult to link these inter-
ests with concrete geographic spaces, much of university-taught IEL refers 
to scholarship created in the Global North, giving those academics great 
prominence in the creation of knowledge.  Today, IEL is a global discipline 
in so far as it is studied throughout the world.  However, regional scholars 
play a secondary role in the creation of knowledge within IEL; their main 
function is to disseminate and apply this knowledge to specific disputes.
This Article aims to study not the rules of IEL, but the creation of 
knowledge within this field, paying special attention to the role of Lat-
in American scholarship.  For this reason, I will refer to both rules and 
rationalities.  The notion of rationality, which I will use in the Weberian 
sense of instrumental rationality, refers to knowledge that promotes cer-
tain ends, e.g. economic development, and defines the necessary means 
to achieve those ends.7  Although Weber recognizes plural forms of a 
rationality, he also emphasizes that a rationality needs to be supported 
by technical knowledge to be considered objective.8  When talking about 
IEL, this is knowledge linked to capitalist economics that facilitates, 
above all things, the possibility of individual rational calculation.9
According to Ruggie, these rationalities motivate and justify States’ 
actions.  They explain States’ actions beyond the mandatory character of 
a rule or the possible gains derived from compliance.10  Although ratio-
nalities cannot causally explain States’ actions since they do not provide 
a deterministic vision of the world, they do help explain why States do 
not act differently.11  Thus, the construction of rationalities is a central tool 
for maintaining order in international economic relations.  They serve to 
define the interests of players, shaping their behavior through incentives 
that ultimately shape their subjectivity.12  A central argument of this Arti-
cle is that scholarship plays a central role as a generator of knowledge 
in IEL, especially of its rationalities.  This means that Latin American 
6 Bhupinder Chimni,  International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the 
Making, 15: 1 European Journal of International Law 1 (2004).
7 Max Weber,  El Sentido de la ‘Neutralidad Valorativa’ de las Ciencias Sociológicas y 
Económicas, in Ensayos Sobre Metodología Sociológica 222 (1973).
8 Id.
9 Max Weber,  Parliament and Government in Germany under a New Political Or-
der, Weber: Political Writings 147–148 (Peter Lassman ed., 1994).
10 Ruggie, supra note 3, at 859–860.
11 Id. at 869.
12 Id. at 862–864; Michel Foucault, Technologies of the Self , Ethics: Subjectivity and 
Truth 223–251 (Paul Rabinov ed., 1997).
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academics who focus on IEL could serve a role beyond the reproduction 
and application of rules of law.  They could also highlight and modify the 
rationalities of IEL, creating new opportunities for Latin America.
The first Part of this Article analyzes the view that scholars of inter-
national law, especially those within IEL, have of their work, and how 
academics in international law contribute to organizing global econom-
ic relations.  The second Part examines the rationalities of IEL from a 
Latin American perspective, emphasizing the constitutive role of knowl-
edge.  The last Part takes these elements to explore the participation of 
Latin American scholarship in the diffusion and consolidation of the 
Latin American and global economic order.  The conclusion highlights 
that the interests at stake in IEL are too important for Latin Ameri-
can scholars to take a passive role regarding the creation of knowledge. 
Whatever opinion we may hold about the global economy, whether for 
or against more state intervention, it is necessary to better understand 
how the current order has been consolidated, how much the margins can 
be maneuvered, and which possible strategies for change exist.  Other-
wise, as Aldo Ferrer warns, Latin America will not be able to “decide [its] 
own destiny within globalization.”13
I. the Work of InternAtIonAl economIc lAW: “orderIng” 
InternAtIonAl economIc relAtIons
A. By Ordering the World, We Create a World
Mainstream international law scholars usually see the purpose of 
international law, that which gives meaning to their profession, as the 
work of ordering international relations.14  Inspired by Kant’s ideal of 
perpetual peace, their mission is to regulate the imperfection of interna-
tional relations in order to avoid war.
It is not much different in the case of IEL.  Mainstream scholarship 
holds that it is necessary to regulate international economic relations.  In 
the worst-case scenario, these relationships can lead to war.  For exam-
ple, protectionism in the 1930s is considered by many to have been one of 
the triggers of World War II.15  Additionally, peace is fundamental for the 
13 Aldo Ferrer, La importancia de las ideas propias sobre el desarrollo y la globalización, 
44 Rev. Prob. Desarrollo 163, 166 (2013).
14 Rasulov, supra note 5, at 2.
15 The tariff wars began with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in the United States. Michael J. 
Trebilcock & Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade 19 (2d ed. 1999).
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efficient development of international economic activity.  The peaceful 
settlement of disputes is an essential pillar of the international economic 
order, necessary to promote liberalization of trade, foreign investment 
and economic development.16
Mainstream international law scholarship also holds that inter-
national relations, both political and economic, already existed before 
international law.  This idea dominates within neorealism and neoliberal 
institutionalism.
Ruggie criticizes these mainstream positions, however, because 
although there are rules that regulate preexisting relations, there are 
also rules that constitute those relationships.17  IEL constitutes interna-
tional relationships, giving them particular forms and certain dynamics. 
International relations can arise naturally, based on the premise that 
human beings are political by nature.  However, it is indisputable that 
terms used within the context of international relations, for exam-
ple the terms ‘civilized’ or ‘uncivilized,’ are created by international 
law and do not occur naturally.  The same could be said of the terms, 
‘developed’ and ‘developing states.’  These terms shape the object of 
regulation.  There are States that must take certain action to ‘develop;’ 
others present themselves to the world as ‘developed.’  The critical cur-
rents of international law have emphasized the role of these terms, or 
rationalities, for decades.18
Nevertheless, mainstream IEL scholarship operates under the 
premise that the law does not play a fundamental role in the constitution 
of economic relations between States.19  From this formalist perspective, 
IEL is presented as a series of rules that apply universally, based on the 
principles of equality, sovereignty and pacta sunt servanda.20  These rules 
16 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Transformation of the World Trading System Through the 1994 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 6 Eur. J. Int’l L. 161, 166–68 (1995).
17 Ruggie, supra note 3, at 871.  See also Andrew Lang, World Trade Law After Neolib-
eralism: Re-imagining the Global Economic Order 160 (2011).
18 Among others, it is important to highlight the work of Anthony Anghie.  See Anthony 
Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (2004).
19 The principal exception can likely be found in the literature of the period between 1950 
to 1970, during the peak of the dependency theory and the right to development.  See also 
Arnulf Becker Lorca, International Law in Latin America or Latin American International 
Law-Rise, Fall, and Retrieval of a Tradition of Legal Thinking and Political Imagination, 47 
Harv. Int’l L.J. 283, 296–97 (2006).
20 Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, 1 Eur. J. Int’l L. 4, 14, 16, 21, 30 
(1990).
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are objective and independent of the particular interests of any State, 
giving the impression of equality among all actors in the international 
community.  This equality is manifested, for example, in the principle 
of reciprocity in trade negotiations, which says that every commercial 
concession requires consideration.  Thus, we systematically hear that 
economic treaties are acts of cooperation and coordination, between two 
or more States, that seek to achieve common objectives.21
Another example of the tension between regulation and constitution 
is found in international investment law.  This regime seeks to protect for-
eign investors from State abuse after they have established investments 
in that State.  However, what happens before establishment—including 
the bargaining that occurs in the shadow of the law—is largely ignored 
by investment law.  In the period prior to foreign investment, parties are 
given unlimited autonomy as if each one were equally powerful.  In reality, 
however, large multinational corporations almost always decide where 
and under what conditions to invest.  Then, after establishment, when the 
State could become stronger due to its sovereign power, the interven-
tion of investment law is deemed necessary to regulate the relationship 
between the “weak” foreign investor and the “strong” State.22
The problem with overvaluing the regulatory vision of IEL is that it 
inhibits the perception of the many consequences of IEL.  Influenced by 
the right to development, Latin American authors criticized the formal 
vision of the principle of equality in the 1960s and 1970s.23  IEL affects 
communities and people on an individual level.  IEL has meddled in the 
lives of everyone, and yet few are concerned with the role of IEL in our 
daily lives.
B. The Indeterminacy of Rules, the Rationalization of International 
Economic Law, and the Problem of Order
The rules that make up IEL are as indeterminate as any legal rule; 
but, this does not mean each State can do what it wants when conducting 
its economic affairs.  Consider the idea of economic development.  Many 
21 See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal International 
Organizations, 42 J. Conflict Resol. 3, 6–8 (1998).
22 See Nicolas M. Perrone, The International Investment Regime and Foreign Investors’ 
Rights: Another View of a Popular Story 107–20 (2013) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London 
School of Economics and Political Science) (on file with author).
23 Héctor Gross Espiell, Derecho Internacional del Desarrollo, in Estudios de Derecho 
Económico II 236 (1980), http://ru.juridicas.unam.mx/xmlui/handle/123456789/16652.
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dimensions of this goal remain unclear.  What is development?  How is 
it reached?  The indeterminacy of the idea of  development puts at risk 
the international economic order.  If each State could do what it wanted 
in order to develop, a goal that may have different meanings in different 
places, the possibility of international conflict would be high.  The global 
economy requires mechanisms capable of minimizing indeterminacy.24 
This is the role of IEL.
During the apogee of dependency theory, scholars, including Lat-
in American scholars, used the Global South’s demand for economic 
development as an emancipatory tool to reinterpret or change the rules 
of IEL.25  Today, however, economic development is presented main-
ly as a discipline that the so-called ‘developed’ countries impose on 
those who are something less than ‘developed.’26  Not coincidentally, 
while the development project created some opportunity for economic 
experimentation in the 1960s and 1970s, the global economic order was 
more porous and indeterminate.  The current investment regime, with its 
more than three thousand treaties, is justified precisely because of the 
uncertainty that prevailed in those years.  These treaties, along with the 
development of certain knowledge within the field, make up the domi-
nant interpretation of international investment law.  A significant step 
toward this dominant interpretation, for example, was Paulsson’s work 
on arbitration without privity.27
Those in charge of reducing the scope of indeterminacy of IEL rules 
are academics, experts and people who apply these rules to specific cases. 
These actors’ interpretation of the fair and equitable treatment doctrine, 
for example, has been consistent among treaties although the wording 
of each of their clauses is different.28  Something similar occurs in WTO 
law.  The term ‘subsidy’ may have different interpretations according 
to economic doctrine, but the WTO has reached a consensus about its 
24 Rasulov, supra note 5, at 4.
25 See Mohammed Bedjaoui, Towards a New International Economic Order (1979). 
For Latin America, see Gross Espiell, supra note 23.
26 Anghie, supra note 18; Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Develop-
ment, Economic Growth, and the Politics of Universality, 132–35, 160–69 (2011).
27 See Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 Foreign Inv. L.J. 232 (1995).  The Ar-
ticle illustrates the role of scholarship and practice in defining the field.  Paulsson says, ‘[b]ut 
explorers have set to discover a new territory for international arbitration.  They have already 
landed on a few islands, and they have prepared maps showing a vast continent beyond.’
28 See Paparinskis, supra note 4.
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meaning.29  A key to understanding the dominant interpretation of the 
rules of international investment and trade law lies in the purpose that 
academics and other actors think these regimes are facilitating: either to 
protect foreign investment, or to promote the progressive liberalization 
of trade.  Knowledge is created to serve these purposes.
Consensus is necessary to maintain the global economic order. 
However, consensus is not just a result of negotiations between States 
nor the exercise of power by the most powerful States.  It is here where 
IEL scholarship plays an important role in creating and articulating 
knowledge.  It is true that some issues, like the meaning of the term ‘sub-
sidy,’ are defined by the jurisdictional bodies of IEL.  But the scope of 
these decisions is delimited by academic work.  IEL scholarship plays 
an important role in the acceptance or rejection of the interpretation of 
terms like ‘fair and equitable treatment’ or ‘subsidy.’
The maintenance of the global economic order requires more than 
resolving indeterminate concepts, however.  An economic order between 
equals can be unstable and, therefore, the rationalities created by IEL 
scholarship tend to promote hierarchies—and not necessarily equali-
ty—between States.  These hierarchies are necessary to maintain order 
in international economic relations.  As long as there are winners and 
losers, both within States and between States, the winner will work to 
reproduce the order.  Protecting foreign investment and promoting trade 
liberalization, then, are adequate rationalities since, as Chang and Wade 
point out, they result in winners and losers.30  A regime that promotes 
equality, in contrast, empowers those who consider themselves losers 
to change the current order.  As Stiglitz and Rodrik explain, developing 
States need space to experiment.31  But a world in constant experimenta-
tion would also necessarily mean a less orderly world.
29 See Andrew Lang, Governing ‘As If’: Global Subsidies Regulation and the Benchmark 
Problem, 67 Current Legal Probs 135, 140 (2014).
30 Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical 
Perspective 2 (2002); Robert Hunter Wade, What Strategies are Viable for Developing Coun-
tries Today?  The World Trade Organization and the Shrinking of ‘Development Space,’ 10 Rev. 
of Int’l Pol. Econ. 621, 623 (Nov. 2003).
31 Dani Rodrik, The Global Governance of Trade—As If Development Really Mattered, 
U.N. Dev. Program Background Paper (2001); Narcis Serra, Shari Spiegel, & Joseph E. Sti-
glitz, Introduction: From the Washington Consensus Towards a New Global Governance, in The 
Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance 3–13 (Narcis 
Serra & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2008).
92
Chicanx-Latinx Law Review [37:83
Dominant knowledge, then, not only establishes rationalities that 
delimit the space of indeterminacy, but also grants legitimacy to eco-
nomic hierarchies by hiding inequalities.32  As such, mainstream IEL 
scholarship serves to make the parties to a free trade agreement behave 
as if they are equals, even if they are not.
II. InternAtIonAl lAW And Its PrIncIPAl rAtIonAlItIes: lAtIn 
AmerIcA’s PolItIcAl And economIc recognItIon
In the early nineteenth century, Latin American countries entered 
into international relations as independent States.  They did not do so in 
a vacuum.  There was already a legal order shaping these relations.  There 
were specific rules that regulated membership to the international com-
munity of States.  There were also general principles that governed the 
relations between members of the international community, including 
membership itself.  The most important general principles were—and 
possibly still are—the equality and sovereignty of States.
The equality of States is a key ordering principle of international 
relations.  But only an analysis of the way equality works in practice can 
tell us how this principle shapes these relations.  Importantly, this prin-
ciple operates as equality between equals, and not as equality between 
sovereign States.  States are only sovereign so as long as they respect 
certain economic and institutional rationalities.  It is the pursuit of those 
rationalities, precisely, that makes them equal to the rest of the ‘civilized’ 
States, validating their membership to the international community.  This 
distinction in international law, between ‘civilized’ equals and ‘uncivi-
lized’ others, was critical to maintaining the international order of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.33
The rationality behind the principle of equality, i.e. the pursuit 
of western civilization, does not causally explain the attitude of Lat-
in American governments at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
However, it does help us understand why these governments sought rec-
ognition from States perceived as sovereign and equal.  As we shall see, 
in the nineteenth century, the principle of equality was interpreted and 
implemented through the rationality of civilization.  In the second half of 
32 Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 
1975–1976 98–126 (David Macey trans., Penguin 2004).
33 Anghie, supra note 18, at 4.
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the twentieth century, this rationality evolved into two standards closely 
linked: neoliberal economic development and the rule of law.
Understood within the context of these rationalities, the principle 
of equality seems as important as the principle of sovereignty and, in fact, 
gives the latter its distinct meaning.  It turns the principle of sovereignty 
into a letter of membership to the international community.  Political 
and economic recognition from the international community has a high 
cost within the international order: it makes any State’s aspiration to be 
different unobtainable.34
A. Being a ‘Civilized’ Country: Equality and Sovereignty
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, joining the internation-
al community was a central objective for Latin American governments.35 
Recognition would only come from States that were already members of 
the international community: namely, European countries and the Unit-
ed States.  To gain recognition, the principle of equality required that 
Latin American States adopt European institutions that were deemed 
‘civilized.’  According to scholarship of the time, the defining elements 
of a sovereign State were existence of civilized institutions.  For newer 
States, it was also important to show that those institutions were natu-
rally suitable for Latin America.  Lacking these institutions meant that 
those lands were condemned to ‘barbarism’ and ‘incivility.’36
International treaties and legal scholarship defined the princi-
ple of equality through the rationality of civilization.  The rationality 
of civilization had a clear constitutive role in the international order 
of the nineteenth century.  This rationality required the implemen-
tation of Western principles, such as private property, as well as the 
imposition of certain conditions for international recognition of newly 
independent States.
34 Jorge L. Esquirol, Can International Law Help: An Analysis of the Colombian Peace 
Process, 16 Conn. J. of Int’l L. 23, 79–80 (2000) (explaining that orthodox Latin American 
international law calls for sovereignty based on racial superiority connected to European civ-
ilization).
35 Felix Becker, Los Tratados de Amistad, Comercio y Navegación y la Integración de los 
Estados Independientes Americanos en el Sistema Internacional, in Problemas de la For-
mación del Estado y de la Nación en Hispanoamérica 247 (1984).
36 Liliana Obregón, ¿Para qué un derecho internacional latinoamericano?, in Derecho in-
ternacional: Poder y Límites del Derecho en la Sociedad Global 27, 37 (René Urueña ed., 
2015).
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Sovereignty never came free of costs.  In the economic arena, this 
can be seen in the peace, friendship, and trade treaties that Latin Ameri-
can countries signed with European States as a way to obtain recognition 
as members of the international community.  These treaties shaped the 
newly born Latin American States.  They defined the content required 
for a civilized society.  They also bilaterally and reciprocally created cer-
tain rules that responded only to the interests of European countries. 
An example is the free navigation of rivers.  Although all parties to the 
treaty benefited from this clause, the new Latin American States did 
not have a merchant fleet at the time.  Many European countries, on 
the other hand, were leaders in maritime and river transportation.  As 
some authors emphasize, this rule—which is the result of the principle 
of equality and reciprocity—limited the creation of a successful Latin 
American merchant fleet.37
When there were greater divergences from ‘civilized’ European 
institutions, Western countries required additional concessions before 
granting international recognition.  For example, in 1825, Haiti became 
indebted to Western governments to compensate their loss of private 
property rights over the people who created and populated Haiti.  Thus, 
Haiti had to contract a loan to compensate slave owners, all according to 
the laws of the metropolis.38
The recognition of Latin American States as sovereign nations 
was also conditioned on their governments acting in accordance with 
the rationalities created and reproduced by international law.  Latin 
American States had to implement and abide by Western standards of 
civilization.  If they did not comply with these standards, which were 
fundamental to the international order, the international community 
reserved the right to intervene to enforce them.  If there existed viola-
tions of the right to private property, for instance, Western states were 
allowed to demand for compliance of this right, ignoring the sovereignty 
of Latin American States.  The principle of no intervention, a key cor-
ollary to the recognition of sovereignty, only applied if States behaved 
in a ‘civilized’ way.  This premise justified diplomatic protection in Latin 
America, and consular institutions in countries like China and Japan.39
37 See Becker, supra note 35.
38 Obregón, supra note 36, at 32–35.
39 Arnulf Becker Lorca, Mestizo International Law: A Global Intellectual Histo-
ry 1842–1933 3–8 (2014).
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The principle of sovereignty, in this way, operates to define mem-
bership to a club, rather than to describe the ability for a people to 
self-govern.  The practice of States and the work of their academics con-
firm this.  In most past cases of intervention, representatives of newer 
States did not challenge the standard of civilization, but instead affirmed 
that they either complied with the standard or were in a rapid process of 
implementing Western institutions.40  These reactions can be explained 
as in accordance with the dominant knowledge of international law, and 
they demonstrate the power of the rationality of equality in internation-
al relations.  Latin American States did not intend to be recognized in 
the international order as different, that is, as autonomous enough to 
implement their own institutions.  As a result of the rationality of equal-
ity and civilization, the principle of sovereignty is almost antagonistic to 
the idea of autonomy.  To be part of the club of sovereign States, a com-
munity had to renounce its autonomy.
B. Joining the Developed World: Equality, Development and the Rule 
of Law
The decolonization process transformed the international order, as 
most of the world’s territory became recognized as belonging to equal 
and sovereign States.  However, the international community maintains 
control over the subjectivity of statehood.  Government, territory and 
population are nothing more than material factors that, in practice, do 
not automatically create sovereignty, as can be seen in the case of Pales-
tine.  Recognition by the international community is still fundamental. 
But after recognition is granted, equality and sovereignty can no longer 
be conditioned on acting in accordance with standards of Western civ-
ilization.  This shift affects the rationality of equality, making it more 
difficult to discipline States’ behavior through the civilized-uncivilized 
dichotomy.  But the international community’s influence on the internal 
affairs of States did not completely disappear, as it is still vital to main-
taining the global economic order.  IEL scholarship performs this task 
through other means and ends, through other rationalities.
Decolonization coincides with the emergence of a new rationality 
for ordering international relations, one which has given IEL its current 
prominence.  Since the second half of the twentieth century, interna-
tional law rationalizes much of the relations between States, both at 
40 Id.
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the regional and global level, based on the economy.  More specifically, 
this rationality is about economic development and growth.41  All States 
are formally equal, but they are not economically equal.  States that 
previously were the masters of civilization are now the masters of devel-
opment, and IEL has recognized this difference since the end of World 
War II and the Bretton Woods Conference.  Two of the key institutions 
of global economic order, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank, have voting mechanisms that reflect this hierarchy.
As with the rationality of civilization, there are two key social facts 
that do not require further verification in the case of development.  One 
is the widespread recognition of some States as ‘developed,’ and the other 
is the desire of the rest to achieve that level of development.  The status of 
‘developed’ does not depend on the level of inequality within the country 
nor whether its financial institutions were protagonists in the most serious 
financial crises of the past century.  No one questions the developed status 
of the United Kingdom or the United States.  On the contrary, these States 
produce knowledge about development in order to shape the behavior of 
countries still in the development process.  This knowledge takes the form 
of rationalities that determine the means and ends of development, and is 
produced by the work of academics and experts in international economic 
organizations, such as the World Bank, the IMF and the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
The so-called ‘developed’ States approve of the rest of the world’s 
desire to develop.  It could even be said that they celebrate it.  Since 
the end of the Second World War, ‘developed’ States have offered finan-
cial, technical and political assistance for development, which is also 
functional to other interests: from fighting communism to influencing 
the internal affairs of other countries.42  Although the rest of the States 
are not obliged to accept this help (or to comply with the development 
rationality), few are willing to be ‘underdeveloped,’ in the same way that 
few were willing to be ‘uncivilized’ in the nineteenth century.  There is 
41 The importance of the rationality of economic development and growth in liberal and 
neoliberal States was set forth by Weber and Foucault.  See Richard Swedberg, Max Weber’s 
Contribution to the Economic Sociology of Law, 2 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 61 (2006); Mi-
chel Foucault, Security, Territory and Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 
1977–1978 95–99, 341–58 (Arnold I. Davidson ed., Graham Burchell trans.) (2009); Michel 
Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978–1979 144, 252 
(Arnold I. Davidson ed., Graham Burchell trans.) (2010).
42 See Anghie, supra note 18.
97
2020] Imagining Alternatives?
external pressure to follow this path, such as the loan conditions imposed 
by the IMF, but there is also a global acceptance of certain means as nec-
essary to achieve economic development.
Unlike the principle of equality and the rationality of civilization, the 
development rationality has taken two historically different forms.  The 
States of the Global South, at least during the first decades of the post-
war period, questioned the rationality of development put forward by the 
United States and Western Europe.  Part of their distrust was due to the 
belief that these States achieved their material prosperity from asymmet-
ric colonial relations or informal domination,43 eliminating, for instance, 
the possibility of a merchant fleet in Latin America.  Between the 1950s 
and 1970s, Latin American States sought to achieve economic develop-
ment through their own rationality, inspired by the dependency theory.
This alternative development rationality was presented as a 
demand to the United States and Western Europe for the reorganiza-
tion of international economic relations.44  This demand insisted upon 
implementing rules that would allow States to manage their national 
economies, mainly their natural resources, and to rely on these resources 
to achieve industrial development.  This emancipatory dimension was 
present in the discourse on the dependency theory concerning trade and 
investment, which distrusts free trade and capital coming from former 
colonial powers.45  Scholars of the alternative development rationality 
believed that the creation of national capital was necessary to achieve 
both economic development and a healthy democracy.46  The aim of this 
demand was, according to Prebisch, to give the population of the Global 
South the same economic and democratic conditions afforded to the 
United States and Western Europe.47
43 Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding The International Eco-
nomic Order 286–288 (2001).
44 This demand is articulated through the right to development.  See Gross Espell, supra 
note 23.
45 In Latin America, the most important examples of this school of thought are Raul Pre-
brisch, Celso Furtado, Ferando H. Cardozo and Enzo Faletto.  See Ricardo Bielschowsky, Cin-
cuenta Años del Pensamiento de la Cepal: Una Reseña, in Cincuenta Años del Pensamiento 
de la Cepal: Textos Seleccionados 9–61 (Vol. 1, 1998).
46 M. Cuaderno Sr., The Anti-Capitalist Attitude, in Private Investment: The Key to Inter-
national Industrial Development; a Report of the San Francisco Conference 52 (1958); 
Raul Prebisch, El Desarrollo Económico de la América Latina y Algunos de sus Principales 
Problemas, 26 Desarrollo Económico 479, 1950 (1986).
47 Prebish, supra note 46, at 479.
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During this period, scholarship in Latin America, and in all of the 
Global South, stressed the importance of an international right to devel-
opment as a basis for a new global economic order.48  It was an alternative 
vision of economic relations between States that demanded different 
systems and rationalities.  This vision was reflected in several resolutions 
of the General Assembly of the United Nations.  The most important 
ones refer to the permanent sovereignty over natural resources49 and 
the economic rights and duties of States.50  Some of these ideas were 
consolidated, though only for a brief period, in the creation of the Eco-
nomic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean (ECLAC) and the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).51
This emancipatory vision of development was defeated at end of 
the 1970s by the development rationality promoted by the United States 
and Western Europe.  The key to development in this Western vision 
was not state-led economic planning but rather attracting private foreign 
investment to promote the most competitive sectors of the economy.52 
This development rationality is based on neoliberalism, and its circu-
lation runs from the North to the South.53  According to the neoliberal 
paradigm of the 1990s, to achieve economic development, States must 
behave in accordance with a new fiscal and institutional discipline.  These 
policies have been designed and implemented by the World Bank, the 
IMF, the OECD, and the new UNCTAD foreign investment division.54
These international economic organizations financed the imple-
mentation of institutions deemed necessary for neoliberal development. 
Many universities in the Global North supported this project.  This is 
how the rationalities of equality and the rule of law came to be, both of 
which urged underdeveloped countries to incorporate the institutions 
of the United States and Western Europe.  Essentially, these institutions 
48 Gross Espiell, supra note 23, at 230–33.
49 G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), (Dec. 14, 1962).
50 G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), (Dec. 12, 1974).
51 Gross Espiell, supra note 23, at 230–33.
52 Vanessa Ogle, State Rights Against Private Capital: The “New International Economic 
Order” and the Struggle over Aid, Trade, and Foreign Investment, 1962–1981, 5 Humanity 211, 
225 (2014).
53 The World Bank, for example, was key in the implementation of agricultural reforms 
suggested by experts such as Hernando de Soto.  See Jorge L. Esquirol, Legal Latin American-
ism, 16 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 145, 153–54 (2013).
54 In the case of UNCTAD, see Tagi Sagafi-Nejad & John H. Dunning, The UN and 
Transnational Corporations: From Code of Conduct to Global Compact 124–26 (2008).
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recognized strong property and contract rights, encouraged reform aimed 
at prioritizing the role of the market as guarantor of economic develop-
ment, and emphasized the need to maintain macroeconomic and fiscal 
stability.55  These measures aimed to plug countries of the Global South 
into the global economy and to promote private foreign investment.
Concerning foreign investment, the neoliberal rationality of devel-
opment was consolidated through asymmetric treaties that promote and 
protect those investments.  These bilateral treaties formally protect inves-
tors of both States, but in practice the great majority of investors come from 
countries of the Global North.  These treaties have resulted in unequal 
benefits, similar to the treaties of friendship, navigation and commerce 
mentioned earlier.  For example, in the case of maritime and river trans-
portation, the industry was present in Latin America, but it was owned 
and controlled by foreigners.  Similarly, in the case of foreign investment 
today, there will be economic growth in Latin America, but it will depend 
on, and be primarily directed by, global capital.56  The implications of for-
eign control are often overlooked and downplayed by much of the current 
literature on international investment arbitration.  This scheme has given 
rise to an emerging transnational capitalist class, which acts as an outsider 
ignoring the needs and values  of each community it impacts.57
The World Trade Organization (WTO) played a vital role in the 
implementation of this neoliberal economic order.  During the 1990s, the 
WTO was the beacon of neoliberal trade reforms.  Its function, accord-
ing to Chang, was to prevent countries from reimplementing policies 
that promoted national industry.58  By considerably limiting support for 
domestic industries, incorporating a strong scheme for protection of 
intellectual property rights, and facilitating the mobility of goods and 
services, the WTO created global value chains.  Joining these chains of 
production became vital in the current configuration of international 
economic relationships.59
55 See Alasdair Roberts, The Logic of Discipline: Global Capitalism and the Archi-
tecture of Government (2010).
56 See Sanjaya Lall, Reinventing Industrial Strategy: The Role of Government Policy in 
Building Industrial Competitiveness, United Nations Publication (Apr. 2004); see also Ha-
Joon Chang, Regulation of Foreign Investment in Historical Perspective, 16 The Eur. J. of Dev. 
Res. 687, 712 (2004).
57 Chimni, supra note 6.
58 Chang, supra note 30.
59 G20 Leaders’ Communiqué, Antalya Summit (2015), http://www.gpfi.org/publications/
g20-leaders-communiqu-antalya-summit-2015.
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During the shift of the 1990s, a large part of Latin American IEL 
scholarship simply followed and reported on these changes and institu-
tional reforms.  While there were criticisms, such as those of Correa in the 
area of intellectual property,60 most Latin American literature focused 
only on systematizing the new legal instruments, and thus reproducing, 
explicitly or implicitly, the neoliberal rationality for development.61
III. lAtIn AmerIcAn Iel scholArshIP And Its contrIbutIon 
to the globAl economIc order
IEL scholarship today presents itself to the world as a global dis-
cipline despite the increasing number of regional and bilateral trade 
agreements, the high degree of fragmentation in the international invest-
ment regime, and the distinct political, economic, and social contexts of 
each country and region.  IEL scholarship does not view these distinct 
contexts as a serious problem, however, because these divergences are 
counterbalanced by global rationalities that serve to minimize differenc-
es and create order in international economic relations.  What is truly 
global and universal about IEL, then, is knowledge.  The regional aca-
demic community does not exhibit a normative or social discontinuity 
with the global community; instead, with only a few exceptions, it is a 
subgroup within that same epistemic community.62  It is not by chance 
that the Latin American IEL network has been created within, and as 
part of, the international network.63
Given the importance of Latin America in international economic 
relations, its academics have some weight in the creation of knowledge 
within IEL.  Despite the diversity of treaty texts and the indeterminacy 
of the law, the existence of IEL indicates some consensus in the creation 
and reproduction of this knowledge.  Much of the scholarship of Latin 
America forms part of that consensus today.  Latin American scholar-
ship criticized this consensus between the 1950s and 1970s, but today, this 
scholarship receives and reproduces IEL dominant knowledge.  The con-
tributions made by many Latin American experts of IEL tend to rely on 
60 Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights, The WTO and Developing Coun-
tries: The TRIPS Agreement and Policy Options (2000).
61 Jose D. Enríquez Rosas, Derecho Internacional Económico. Instituciones y Críticas Con-
temporáneas, 8 Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional 791 (2008).
62 These exceptions are limited almost exclusively to the area of intellectual property.  See 
Correa, supra note 60.  See also the work of Rafael Pérez Miranda in the area of biotech and 
seeds.
63 See http://iellatina.blogspot.com.  The author is a member of this network.
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dominant rationalities and, thus, work to consolidate the current global 
economic order.  These experts represent the region in an indirect man-
ner, and many acquiesce to the current order.  The participation of Latin 
American judges and arbitrators, many of them also academics, is used 
to argue in favor of the legitimacy of the international regime, regardless 
of the content of judicial decisions.
A. Contributing by Teaching
Like most legal education in Latin America, IEL is geared towards 
the professional market and taught as a practice that must be learned 
and applied to concrete cases.64  This approach ignores the constitutive 
role of the law and its socioeconomic context.  While this approach is 
common to all areas of law, it is easier for students to realize that domes-
tic law, whether it is property or contract law, is the result of a struggle 
between different political interests.  This is because students experience 
or witness these struggles in everyday life.  In the context of IEL, howev-
er, this realization is more difficult given the apparent distance between 
students and international economic relations.  These international 
struggles mostly interest elites and have little to do with the everyday 
life of workers and students.65
International moot court competitions illustrate how legal edu-
cation is taught as a practice to a professional market.66  Moot court 
competitions encourage students to resolve disputes by repairing the 
lost order in concrete international economic relations.  Students travel 
across the world to plead before many of the experts who execute the 
development rationality, whether through foreign investment or interna-
tional trade law.  These competitions teach and train students to operate 
within the dominant rationalities of the current global economic order. 
64 See Carlos Lista, La Construcción de la Conciencia Juridical: Los Objetivos Educativos 
y la Formación del Abogado, 5 Anuario 381, 394–95 (2000); Rogelio Pérez Perdomo, Desafíos 
de la Eduación Juridical Latinoamericana en Tiempos de Globalización, 38 El Otro Derecho 
11, 19–20 (2008).  The formalization of the teaching of law as strictly a practice obscures the 
constitutive side of the learning process.  As Lista explains, teaching law not only imparts legal 
knowledge, but also permits the formation of a legal conscience.  Lista, supra, at 386–87.
65 Gerry Simpson recognizes that one of the problems with international law scholarship 
is the omission of such context.  Simpson, supra note 5, at 88.
66 See Karen Bravo, International Economic Law in US Law Schools: Evaluating its Ped-
agogy and Identifying Future Challenges, in International Economic Law: The state and 
future of the discipline 135, 155 (Colin Picker et al. eds., 2008).  The most important inter-
national competitions are the Jessup, the Vis, the FDI Moot, and the ELSA-WTO.  The author 
has direct knowledge of the Vis and the FDI Moot, and indirect knowledge of the other two.
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The problem is that mooting only focuses on the dispute-resolution role 
of IEL, downplaying the constitutive character of knowledge in this 
field.  These competitions, in other words, prepare the next generation of 
experts to support the existing order.  Some of these students are later 
recruited by international law firms, where they are employed to contin-
ue this support.
B. Contributing by Defending States’ Interests
Defending States’ interests can be another way of contributing to 
the consolidation of the existing order, a task in which Latin American 
academics and experts routinely participate.  In the nineteenth century, 
for instance, Carlos Calvo did not criticize the distinction between civ-
ilized and noncivilized nations.  Instead, he defended Latin American 
States, arguing that they complied with Western standards on the ground 
that they, like European States and the United States, respected private 
property.67  Japanese and Chinese academics did the same, seeking to 
demonstrate that their countries behaved according to the prevailing 
rationalities by having incorporated Western private and public law 
institutions.68
By participating in these debates, Latin American academics—like 
academics from other periphery countries—influenced international law. 
Becker Lorca affirms that there existed a circulation of thoughts and 
ideas amongst experts around the world.69  However, in my opinion this 
circulation of ideas has to be framed within the rationalities of equality 
and sovereignty, and the civilized-uncivilized dichotomy.  Becker Lorca 
describes an act of resistance in which actors strategically use the dom-
inant knowledge of international law to their advantage.  This strategy 
may prevail in a specific or doctrinal controversy, but it is difficult to 
think of a scenario where this strategy would successfully modify the 
dominant rationalities.  The participation of Latin American and Asian 
academics described by Becker Lorca can, I believe, be described as a 
tragedy in the sense that little or nothing has changed in the dominant 
knowledge within international law.
Two recent examples illustrate this tragic situation.  First, Argen-
tina’s defense in investment arbitration proceedings after the 2001 
67 Becker Lorca, supra note 19, at 302.
68 Becker Lorca, supra note 39, at 4–5.
69 Id. at 7.
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economic crisis was highly ineffective when it relied on arguments based 
entirely on domestic constitutional law not reflected in international 
investment law.70  When Argentina changed its strategy and used interna-
tional law arguments, the country obtained some victories in arbitration 
proceedings.  In doing so, Argentina helped clarify the interpretation of 
the ‘state of necessity’ exception present in many treaties.  At the same 
time, however, Argentina also helped consolidate present-day invest-
ment arbitration.  Despite the long list of cases and awards against 
Argentina, this country neither terminated its bilateral investment trea-
ties nor initiated an internal review process.
Second, a similar argument can be made of Brazil’s role in WTO 
litigation, which academics often regard as successful.71  This success lies 
in victories achieved in the area of  agricultural subsidies.  These victo-
ries illustrate that a country like Brazil can and, in fact, did prevail over 
the United States and the European Union under the current legal and 
institutional arrangements.  Literature highlighting Brazil’s success aims 
to do two things.  First, it portrays the possibilities available to countries 
of the Global South within the framework of the WTO.  Second, it legit-
imatizes the rules of the WTO, responding to critics in the Global South.
Those who defend Latin American states before the WTO or 
investment tribunals also contribute to the existing global economic 
order when, after their success, they are hired by global law firms that 
perpetuate the current order.  This is true of prominent lawyers from the 
Global South in the field of investment arbitration.  The flow of lawyers 
from State defense teams to global private law firms ultimately strength-
ens the dominant rationalities of IEL.
C. Contributing Through Research
Latin American research also contributes to the consolidation of 
the global economic order.  This is largely due to academic and profes-
sional motivations.  Many regional academics are educated abroad, the 
dominant language of IEL is English, and many renowned Latin Amer-
icans take positions outside of the region.72  Additionally, scholars face 
70 The Argentine position was known as the “Rosatti doctrine.”  See Horacio D. Rosatti, 
Los Tratados Bilaterales de Inversion, el Arbitraje Internacional Obligatorio y el Sistema Con-
stitucional Argentino, Revista Juridica La Ley, 67–198 (October 15, 2003).
71 Gregory Shaffer et al., The Trials of Winning at the WTO: What Lies Behind Brazil’s 
Success, 41 Cornell Int’l L.J. 383, 456 (2008).
72 Esquirol, supra note 53, at 148–154.
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pressure from university rankings and the increasing need to publish in 
internationally recognized journals.  Furthermore, there are close rela-
tionships between Latin American academics and practitioners in both 
the private and public sector.  These relationships are understandable 
given that the idea of  an exclusively academic career in the legal sector 
is something still quite new to the region.
These circumstances do not break the link between scholarship and 
scholars’ Latin American roots, but they do shape the way this link is 
constructed.  Academics often focus on the particular situation of their 
country or region.  Latin American academic research, however, tends 
to address issues from the epistemological perspectives developed in 
academic centers in the Global North.  It is not that Latin American 
academics have forgotten their roots, but rather that they work through 
theoretical and methodological lenses produced in other latitudes, 
implicitly incorporating the rationalities that dominate their research.73
In a world where international recognition is of fundamental impor-
tance to universities and their academics, this orientation is reasonable. 
For those who are in Latin America, international recognition is espe-
cially valuable if it comes from researchers and universities of the Global 
North.74  The most relevant form of recognition is citation in specialized 
journals of prominent academic centers—journals that are usually situ-
ated outside of the Latin America.  Being recognized by these centers is 
difficult to start with, and it is likely more difficult if the author’s position 
defies dominant rationalities.
Thus, IEL knowledge not only dictates the actions of States, but 
also the actions of academics.  This is not surprising given that deep crit-
icisms of IEL would put the global economic order at risk.  Those who 
want to promote change through scholarship, then, face the difficult and 
nearly impossible task of disrupting current IEL paradigms.75
International investment law, which is likely one of the most con-
troversial areas of IEL today, illustrates the role played by regional 
scholarship.  Latin America is the region most often sued by foreign 
investors, and Latin American governments have strongly criticized 
investment arbitration.  Nonetheless, the most important critiques have 
73 Id.
74 Obregón, supra note 36, at 51.
75 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition 
and Change (1977).
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not come from the region.  If we look at the global context, the stron-
gest criticism of this area of law comes from Canadian and European 
academics.  Canadian academics articulated a sophisticated critique 
after their country was condemned several times within the context of 
NAFTA.76  More recently, a group of European academics have spoken 
publicly against investment arbitration within the framework of transat-
lantic negotiations.77  In Latin America, on the other hand, criticism by 
governments has not been supported by the majority of Latin Ameri-
can scholars.  Latin American critique has only been moderate.78  This 
attitude is linked to the dominant rationalities, that is to say the need to 
become developed, and to the academic and professional dynamics that 
dominate Latin America.
conclusIon
This Article has aimed to stimulate a debate about the role of Latin 
American IEL scholarship.  From a doctrinal perspective, the role of 
scholarship is to analyze rules and to support sometimes frenetic inter-
national negotiations.  The main objective is to offer Latin American 
States the best possible results within the current global economic order. 
Those who support this position will tell us that Latin American States 
and corporations need lawyers who will defend their interests, and that 
scholarship can play an important educational and supportive role for 
these lawyers.
This vision explains why many Latin American States began nego-
tiating free trade agreements, and why States who were not yet in the 
negotiation stage—and perceived themselves as lagging behind—began 
76 See Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Vaughan 
Lowe ed., 2007).  See also David Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Global-
ization: Investment Rules and Democracy’s Promise (Chris Arup et al. eds., 2008).  See 
also Gus Van Harten & David Schneiderman, Public Statement on the International Invest-
ment Regime (Aug. 31, 2010) (available at http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public-statement- 
international-investment-regime-31-august-2010) (last visited Mar. 8, 2016) (only two of those 
who subscribed have academic or research positions in Latin America).
77 Harm Schepel, Statement of Concern about Planned Provisions on Investment Protection 
and Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part-
nership (TTIP) (August 2014) (available at https://aepf.info/single-post/2014/08/17/ Statement-
of-Concern-about-Planned-Provisions-on-Investment-Protection-and-Investor-State-
Dispute-Settlement-ISDS-in-the-Transatlantic-Trade-and-Investment-Partnership-TTIP) 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2020).
78 See Lorca, supra note 19, at 288 (contending that Latin American scholarship of interna-
tional law became more moderate after the 1970s).
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working to remove existing institutional barriers.79  These actions are 
reasonable if we assume that the treaty regime is the new norm, and 
that the longer a country waits to join, the more costly the negotiation 
process will be in the future.80  The problem is that, whatever opinion 
one may have about free trade agreements, there is no reason to assume 
that these treaties are inevitable.  Latin American scholarship can do 
much more than produce the best treaty-negotiation strategies; it can 
work to highlight unexplored options and transform the current global 
economic order.
The interests at stake are too important for academics to be passive. 
Academics should, of course, defend States’ concrete interests, many of 
which are settled in various dispute settlement mechanisms.  However, 
they should also work to reorder IEL to create a system that allows Lat-
in American countries to implement policies that respond to their needs. 
Academics should seek to educate responsible citizens in the local and 
global context, and not simply serve as private and public consultants.81 
Latin America needs academics to be conscious of the constitutive role 
that scholarship plays in the global economic order.  Otherwise, policy 
alternatives will be limited to either joining the global coalition of open 
markets or being economically ostracized.82
Undoubtedly, coming up with alternatives is not an easy task.  Latin 
American IEL scholars should be more self-conscious of their constitu-
tive role in the global economic order.  But authors who take on this role, 
a position sometimes perceived as critical, often encounter either doctri-
nal objections or demands for concrete solutions.  It is not surprising that 
those who support IEL’s dominant knowledge reject alternative visions 
for the global economic order under the pretext that the alternatives 
are political and partial.  As this Article has shown, however, the same 
can be said of IEL’s dominant knowledge.  As for those who demand 
79 See Frederico Pinedo, Hacia un Nuevo Mercosur, La Nacion (July 31, 2015), http://www.
lanacion.com.ar/1814925-hacia-un-nuevo-mercosur (discussing the current situation of Brazil 
and Uruguay, in which they cannot negotiate free trade agreements due to the limitations 
imposed by Mercosur); see also Uruguai Está de Acordo com Brasil Sobre Tratado Entre Mer-
cosul e UE, Globo (May 8, 2015), http://g1.globo.com/economia/noticia/2015/05/uruguai-esta-
de-acordo-com-brasil-sobre-tratado-entre-mercosul-e-ue.html.
80 Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Trans-pacific Partnership Agreement and Development, in 
Trade Liberalisation and International Co-operation: A Legal Analysis of the Trans- 
Pacific Partnership Agreement 28–49 (Tania Voon ed., 2013).
81 Simpson, supra note 5, at 84.
82 Robert Zoellick, Unleashing the Trade Winds, The Economist, Dec. 5, 2002.
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concrete solutions, their requests are rooted in an implicit acceptance of 
the current order.  They reject solutions that may require reconsidering 
the terms of the debate or thinking about issues through a new perspec-
tive.  The production of alternative options, in other words, requires an 
active attitude towards the production of new knowledge.
The articulation of concrete alternatives also faces an epistemolog-
ical obstacle.  Today, IEL can only be understood according to certain 
neoclassical, neoliberal, and post-neoliberal premises that shape the 
global economic order.  The relationship between foreign investment, 
free trade, and development illustrates this obstacle.  Dependency theory 
and the goal of regional economic integration provided the epistemolog-
ical support for an alternative vision in the 1960s and 1970s.  At present, 
however, the lack of an alternative economic vision makes it more diffi-
cult for IEL scholars to articulate options to the current global economic 
order that take into account material and normative inequalities.
We should also keep in mind certain epistemological limitations 
that are internal to IEL itself.  This field is inescapably linked to eco-
nomic globalization.  For those who believe any kind of globalization 
is a problem, a satisfactory answer may require more radical approach-
es than those that can be articulated through IEL.  Contributions from 
sociology and anthropology may be useful for reimagining IEL, but they 
must be used strategically and with caution if the intent is to reorder 
international economic relations.  There is a risk that some IEL academ-
ics label these efforts as exotic ideas too removed from IEL.83  Private 
foreign investors, for example, seek economic returns and do not act for 
charity.  Any foreign investment regulation cannot ignore this fact unless 
the goal is to restrict foreign investment and unwind globalization.  This 
Article has not addressed these more radical approaches.  It only seeks 
to point out that IEL can open up opportunities for those who believe 
that each country and region should be able to choose its policies and 
destiny within the broad process of economic globalization.
83 See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Refundacion Del Estado En America Latina: 
Perspectivas Desde Una Epistemologia Del Sur (2010) (discussing the importance of global 
south epistemologies for reimagining IEL).  But see Esquirol, supra note 53, at 166, (describing 
how a reimagination of IEL could risk transforming an alternative discourse into an exotic 
one).
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The original Spanish version of this Article was written in 2015. 
The global economic order has, since then, suffered a significant back-
lash.  Most importantly for Latin America, the United States changed its 
position on international trade and foreign investment markedly.  The 
Trump administration has embraced a more nationalistic and mercan-
tilist approach, wherein international trade is regarded as a zero-sum 
game.  This attitude emphasizes the existence of winners and losers, 
destabilizing the existing global economic order.  The United States suc-
cessfully pursued the renegotiation of NAFTA, and has engaged in a 
trade war with China.  The latter has attracted most of the academic and 
political attention.
At the same time, there is not much IEL scholarly debate about 
the implications of this policy shift for the rest of the world and, partic-
ularly, for Latin America.  International trade discussions in the United 
States increasingly reflect the demands of those suffering the conse-
quences of rising inequality in that country, linking this problem with 
the global economy and the rules of IEL.  Focusing on inequality can 
imply a positive change for IEL, opening up spaces to reconsider domi-
nant knowledge in this field, particularly, the premise that international 
trade and foreign investment are the only, or the most efficient, means 
to economic wellbeing.  Negatively, however, the debate in the United 
States has remained somewhat disconnected from the consequences that 
nationalism and mercantilism may impose on other countries, such as 
its Latin American neighbors.  The discussion so far has been U.S.-cen-
tric, focused on inequality within the United States rather than global 
inequality or global economic structures.  The discussions of a Green 
New Deal, arguably a progressive proposal, do not consider the role of 
other countries or the needs of those countries’ populations.84  For Latin 
America, this can be problematic.  IEL scholarship needs to raise aware-
ness about the perils of a policy that puts the needs of people in the 
United States—or other Global North countries—before those of their 
neighbors living in Latin America and the rest of the world.
84 See Todd Tucker, Industrial Policy and Planning: What It Is and How to Do It 
Better (2019).
